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Substance and Method in the
Year 2000
Akhil Reed Amar'
The 1999 Term featured an extraordinary array of interesting constitutional
decisions across a broad range of substantive issues-more significant statements
and restatements, perhaps, than in any Term of the last decade.2 However, no
single case or set of cases towers above all others in significance. To do justice to
a Term of this character, it seems best to tour several legal neighborhoods to get
some sense of the overall landscape. The seven cases I have selected for
commentary are, I think, broadly representative of the current Court's output,
though they are not a wholly random sample. Rather, I have tried to identify some
of the cases where documentarian and doctrinalist approaches might diverge most
clearly, so that we may best compare their respective insights and consequences.'
Given my particular assignment for this forum, I will direct my comments first to
issues of sovereign immunity; and I will then proceed to consider violence against
women, late-term abortions, religious liberty, and unenumerated rights.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,4 the Court divided five-to-four, with
Justice O'Connor writing for the five over a strong dissent by Justice Stevens.5
The Kimel Court invalidated Congress' Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA) insofar as Congress authorized state employees to sue states for
damages when victimized by state discrimination. 6  Rightly read, the
Constitution's text, history, and structure do not support what the Court did, nor
does the Court's ruling reflect an attractive normative vision. Here, at least, the
1. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
2. The pages that follow are excerpted from my foreword to the Harvard Law Review. See Akhil
Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 26 (2000) [hereinafter Amar, Foreword].
3. For definitions of documentarianism and doctrinalism see generally Amar, Foreword, supra note
2. Several other cases might also have illustrated my general conclusions. In particular, Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (declining to overrule Miranda), exemplifies the current Court's
extraordinary confidence in itself and its own precedents: the Great and Powerful Oz Has Spoken! Even
more noteworthy isApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (calling into question important aspects
of judicial sentencing). The several opinions in Apprendi (especially Justice Thomas' ambitious
concurrence) raise fascinating issues of method and of substance. Indeed, the case is so rich that I simply
pass over it today in hopes of returning to it some other day. Many other cases from last term are of large
substantive significance, but cast only indirect light on the methodological issues I seek to examine today.
4. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
5. Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by the Chief Justice, and by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas. Justice Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
6. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at91.
document is better than the doctrine.'
Citing the 1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana8 and the more recent case of
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,9 among others, Justice O'Connor declared that "for
over a century now, we have made clear that the Constitution does not provide for
federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States."'" This view, she
stressed, is now supported by "firmly established precedent.""
Notwithstanding doctrine to the contrary, the document unambiguously
provides federal jurisdiction over all federal question cases, regardless of party:
Article III, section 2 expressly says that "the judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under" the Constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States. 2 Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment applies whenever a
citizen sues his own state, or indeed, under a proper "diversity" reading, whenever
a lawsuit arises under federal law." Undergirding these basic textual points are
two structural precepts. First, whenever federal law applies, federal courts must
have matching authority to adjudicate. Federal judicial power is coextensive with
federal legislative power. Second, where there is a right, in general there should
be a remedy. The federal government has authority to create rights against states,
and when these rights are violated, federal courts should be open to offer federal
remedies.
The countervailing doctrine of state "sovereign immunity" invoked by Hans
and by the Kimel majority, is constitutional nonsense. It is, quite literally, the
precise negation of the Founders' root idea that the People are sovereign and that
governments are not. There is no constitutional right for government to violate
the Constitution and get away with it. This is so even if "sovereign immunity"
was a traditional concept at the Founding. In important ways, the Constitution
broke with pre-existing traditions of monarchy, aristocracy, permanent standing
armies, established churches, seditious libel laws, and governmental (as opposed
to popular) sovereignty. Hans and Kimel echo the very error that led Justices like
Samuel Chase to support the infamous Sedition Act of 1798. (That law, too, was
rooted in an inapt analogy to Parliamentary sovereignty.) 4 Where government is
sovereign-the source of all law-logic suggests that government may not legally be
sued unless it creates a law that allows the suit, and thereby "consents." But in
7. For more documentation and elaboration of my expansive claims in this section, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1466-92 (1987) [hereinafter Amar,
Sovereignty].
8. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
9. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
10. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (citing, inter alia, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)); see also Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
11. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79.
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.") Under the "diversity" reading of this
Amendment, these words simply repeal the earlier grant of Article III citizen-state diversity jurisdiction at
issue in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), but do not in any way limit the other fonts of
Article IIIjurisdiction-for example over federal questions and admiralty. In essence Chisholm's error was
the creation of a pro-creditor federal common law in a diversity case, and the People responded by restricting
diversity jurisdiction. For more details, see Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 1474-75 & n. 202.
14. See Amar, Foreword, supra note 2, at 56-57.
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America, the People, not the governments, are the source of law, and there is no
such thing as governmental sovereign immunity where the government has
violated the Constitution. In these situations, government is not "sovereign."
Nor should it be "immune." Even if some constitutional rights must go
unremedied in the real world, the general idea of full remedies is a regulatory ideal
towards which the Constitution, when read in light of its history and structure,
does and should aim. This ideal may be qualified-via statutes of limitation,
laches, waivers, and the like-but it must not yield to an idea of "sovereign
immunity" that is the logical negation of constitutionally limited government.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, takes his stand with the document against the
doctrine:
Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole
Tribe as controlling precedent. First and foremost, the reasoning of that
opinion is so profoundly mistaken and so fundamentally inconsistent
with the Framers' conception of the constitutional order that it has
forsaken any claim to the usual deference or respect owed to decisions of
this Court.'5
Stevens adds a few other reasons for resisting the pull of stare decisis, but this first
one contrasts markedly with his emphasis on judicial nose-counting in Stenberg
v. Carhart"6 (which we shall consider below). After all, the "diversity" reading
that he embraces in Kimel had many fewer judicial adherents in the twentieth
century than the competing view. But this nose-counting should not end the issue.
The judicial noses are wrong and the "diversity" reading is right-at least if the
Constitution itself is the touchstone. (Although many documentary issues are hard,
some are easy.)
There is, however, a remaining structural argument to address: Why should
states be suable absent their consent when the federal government is immune
absent its consent? Where a mere violation of federal statute is at issue, the
answer is that the federal government may properly bind state governments yet
exempt itself. This greater power of total exemption subsumes the lesser power
of subjecting itself to its own laws, but with limitations on lawsuits against itself.
However, where the federal government has violated the federal Constitution
itself-a source of law higher than government-then it should indeed be no more
"sovereign" or "immune" than a state government. Alas, even the Justices who
have challenged state sovereign immunity have yet to go this far. Until they do,
they too have fallen short of the document's admirable vision of limited
governments and full remedies.
In recent years, the Rehnquist Court has tried to revive federalism in a variety
of contexts, often insisting-rightly-that the Framers envisioned federalism as a
15. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97-99 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
16. 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
system for protecting liberty. "Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist
system is a check on abuses of government power .... 'If [the people's] rights are
invaded by either [government,] they can make use of the other as the instrument
of redress.""' 7 "[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for. the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end
in itself."' 8 In cases like Kimel, how, exactly, are abuses checked and rights
redressed when states escape liability for their illegalities? A more proper
documentarian approach, building on the very Founding sources the Court has
invoked but failed to follow, would use federalism to protect rights, not defeat
them. Each government would have reciprocity not in shielding itself when it
violates the Constitution, but in empowering citizens to gain full remedies when
the other government has violated the Constitution. In this view, the federal
government should be recognized- as having broad power to arm Americans with
remedies against states when states have violated the Constitution and valid
federal laws. The reciprocal counterpart of this federal power is not sovereign
immunity for lawless states, but rather the right of states to arm citizens with
remedies against the federal government when the feds have violated the
Constitution. For example, state property law helps give a citizen standing to sue
when the federal government has taken his property without due process or just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and state tort law helps
provide a remedy when federal officials violate a citizen's Fourth Amendment
rights in an improper search or seizure of his person or property. '9
So much for the views of the Founders. Holistic documentarian analysis also
ponders the meaning of later constitutional moments, like Reconstruction. And
here, the Kimel Court's pronouncements become odder still. Surely, if the
Fourteenth Amendment was about anything, it was about ensuring that states
follow federal law. When a state flouts federal law, it thereby offends due process
of law, in violation of section 1. And when a state violates section 1, surely
Congress has power under section 5 to act, even under a very narrow reading of
section 5. Yet Kimel, following recent precedent,2 ° holds that Congress lacks
Reconstruction power to insist that, when states trample federal rights, federal
courts stand open to make victims whole. 2
Finally, Kimel claims that although Congress may properly forbid age
discrimination by states under its Commerce Clause power, it may not do so
pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Building on the 1997
City of Boerne23 case, Kimel seems to suggest that congressional power to
recognize new civil rights exists only where there is a clear antecedent pattern of
17. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 180-81
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
18. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
19. For more analysis, see Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 1492-519; Akhil Reed Amar, Using
State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Questions andAnswers about Converse- 1983,
64 U. CoLo. L. REV. 159 (1993).
20. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
21. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000).
22. Id. at 66-67.
23. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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state misbehavior.24 Here, no such pattern of state misbehavior exists. (Indeed
most states have banned age discrimination on their own.) But this new rule of
doctrine contrasts sharply with the text, history, and overall architecture of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself. The Reconstruction Republicans aimed to give
Congress broad power to declare and define the fundamental rights-the privileges
and immunities-of American citizens above and beyond the floor set by courts."
The fact that many states deem a certain right important-like the right against age
discrimination -may properly support a Congressional determination that such a
right is indeed fundamental today. Courts, for example, look at the actual
practice of states to determine what punitive practices are "cruel and unusual"
today.26 Likewise, Congress may properly consult state practice in playing its
assigned rights-protecting role under section 5, as envisioned by the American
People who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. And this documentary
scheme-in which Congress may go above the judicially declared floor of
fundamental rights-is, I submit, a more attractive one than the Court-centric
regime exemplified by cases like Kimel and Boerne.
II. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
A. A Curious Per Curiam
Stepping back now from Kimel and sovereign immunity, let us take a more
expansive look at the 1999 Term. It started on a haunting note. In the first month
of the session and its first opinion of any significance, the Court, with little
support from the document itself, set aside the conviction of a man who murdered
his wife.27 The way the Court did so is also troubling-with no proper briefing, no
chance for amici to weigh in, no public oral argument, no signed opinion, no
more than a page of analysis, no careful consideration of counterarguments, no
evidence of real collective deliberation, and no recorded dissents. It is the ultimate
in Rehnquist Court efficiency. But to what end?
The uncontested facts were simple. James Michael Flippo and his wife
Cheryl" were vacationing in an isolated cabin in a rustic state park.29 Mr. Flippo
24. 528 U.S. at 80-82.
25. See generally Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City
of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding ofSection 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 139-40 (1999);
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILLOF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 175 (1998) [hereinafter Amar,
Bill of Rights]; PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN & AKHIL REED AMAR, PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 546-50 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Brest, et al.l.
26. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
27. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999).
28. The Supreme Court never tells us her name; nor does it ever get around to telling us about the
sentence, or the precise grade of the offense. For these and other facts, I have relied on the parties' briefs
seeking and opposing certiorari.
29. See id. at 12.
called 911 to report that they had been attacked by an intruder wielding a log and
a knife.3' When police arrived, they found Mrs. Flippo dead, her head covered
with blood from an apparent bludgeoning.3' Police took Mr. Flippo to the hospital,
and proceeded to investigate the crime scene. 2 They found an unlocked briefcase
in the cabin, and opened it.33 It contained photos that seemed to incriminate Mr.
Flippo, and these were ultimately introduced into evidence.34 A West Virginia jury
found Mr. Hippo guilty of first degree murder, and the state sentenced him to life
imprisonment.3"
The Supreme Court, per curiam, reversed and remanded, reasoning as
follows: A lawful search under the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant-except
when it doesn't-and here the uncontested facts did not apparently qualify as a
proper exception. In particular, the trial court made no factual finding that Mr.
Flippo had somehow consented to the search of the briefcase and photos. (Actual
consent would count as a proper exception to the warrant requirement.) Absent
some special finding of this sort, the warrantless search was unconstitutional, and
its fruits-the photos-should have been suppressed at trial regardless of their
relevance and reliability. On remand, the trial court could sustain the conviction
only by making additional factual findings (such as consent) or by determining
that the photos clearly made no difference at trial and were thus harmless error.
Otherwise, the conviction must be undone.
The case exemplifies how the Court has often taken broadly acceptable
constitutional text and turned it into dubious doctrine.36 The People's Fourth
Amendment condemns unreasonable searches and seizures. Were the cops here
unreasonable? Most citizens, I suspect, would say no; but the Court.says yes (and
without a recorded dissent). The People's Constitution contains nothing to
support excluding reliable evidence. Most citizens, I think, shudder at the idea of
springing a murderer and burying the evidence; but the Court blithely does just
that (again, without dissent).
On this set of issues, the citizens seem wiser than the Justices. The text
ratified by the People does not require warrants for all searches and seizures, nor
is this a sensible global requirement. As a matter of history, no one at the
Founding-no framer, no treatise writer, no judge-ever said that intrusions always
require warrants. Arrests, for example, are obvious seizures of persons, yet they
have never required warrants, nor have searches incident to arrest, nor searches
on the high seas, nor various inspection programs, nor border searches, nor







36. Over the next several pages, I shall be making sweeping claims about constitutional meaning;
claims that I have elsewhere tried to document in detail. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997) [hereinafter, Amar, Criminal
Procedure]. See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs ofAssistance, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53 (1996) [hereinafter, Amar, Writs]; Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998). This body of work has its critics, but
I continue to stand by it.
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dangerous devices, in part because they immunized searchers from after-the-fact
tort liability in trespass suits that might otherwise be brought by searchees.
Flippo declared that the facts before the Court were squarely controlled by the
1978 case, Mincey v. Arizona.37 Mincey in turn relied on earlier cases that simply
misread the Fourth Amendment's text and history as requiring warrants.38
Mincey's words, and the words of these earlier cases, should not be treated as
gospel when proved erroneous. But on an epistemic view, even if some of these
cases' words should be discounted, their precise holdings on their facts may distill
important insights. Thus, a precedent-sensitive documentarian might recast the
cases as follows: Yes, the text of the Amendment does not say that all intrusions
require warrants, nor is this a sensible global requirement. But police departments
(which did not exist as such at the Founding) pose special threats in today's world,
and these threats require special safeguards. Overzealous cops can overreact, with
severe consequences for values of liberty, privacy, property, and equality. Where
a very intrusive and highly discretionary activity is involved, like choosing to
search a person's home, we should generally, though not always, require the
police to get preclearance from someone more detached, like a magistrate or judge.
Preclearance can help prevent police discrimination and abuse of discretion, and
can also freeze the facts by giving us a record of what the police knew before the
search. This fact-freezing makes it harder for cops to fabricate ex-post
rationalizations for their intrusions. In "exceptional" situations where there is a
diminished risk of police abuse, or where there are strong reasons for bypassing
preclearance, however, even warrantless intrusions can be upheld as "reasonable."
Had the Flippo Court looked at precedent from this more documentarian
perspective, it might have noted some important distinctions. Mincey on its facts
was indeed a case of police overreaction. Ten cops tried to enter Mincey's
apartment in a drug bust, and Mincey shot and killed one officer.39 The fallen
officer's comrades responded with a four-day search of the apartment, ripping up
carpets and seizing hundreds of objects.4 But there are obvious differences, as a
matter of reasonableness, between Mincey's facts and Flippo's. Flippo's search
occurred, not in his home, but in a cabin owned by the state itself, which surely
had its own legitimate interests triggered by a murder on state grounds. In
Mincey, the police had already nabbed the suspect; in Flippo, the police had been
told that an unknown intruder had come, and for all the police knew, might soon
come back. Perhaps the intruder had been looking for something-maybe in the
briefcase?-and the cops had good reason for searching quickly before the trail
went cold. In Mincey, the police themselves initiated the initial encounter (the
drug bust); in Flippo, they were responding to a documented 911 call with a
37. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
38. See, e.g., id. at 390 (citing, inter alia, Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948)). For
other cases rooting the warrant requirement in the alleged dictates of text and history, see Amar, Writs,
supra note 36, at 73 n. 81.
39. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 387.
40. Id. at 389.
verbatim phone transcript of the facts as they knew them before they came on the
scene. (Thus the facts were frozen and documented in far more detail than in a
typical warrant.) Unlike the Mincey cops, the Flippo police were not overreacting
to a fallen comrade or trashing an abode. They were just doing what most citizens
would want them to do.4'
The state judge, who upheld the search in a terse paragraph, did not quite say
all this, but the foregoing analysis is based on the uncontested facts of the case.
Before reversing the lower court's judgment, the Supreme Court should have
explained why these uncontested facts did not suffice to uphold the decision below.
Instead, the Justices brusquely reversed and remanded, seemingly offended that
"the trial court made no attempt to distinguish Mincey. ''42 Apparently, lower
courts must not simply get it right, but must also talk Supreme Court talk.
What the trial court said, in its two-sentence paragraph, could be construed
as suggesting that Mincey was wrong. Mincey rejected a general "homicide crime
scene" exception to the warrant requirement, and the trial judge might be read as
embracing such a general exception. But a more charitable reading of the trial
court's commonsense ruling is that, on the facts of this homicide, a warrantless
search was reasonable, even if warrantless searches might well be unreasonable
in some other homicides, like the one in Mincey. Though the overall issue of
reasonableness is not always clearcut, and faithful documentarians will disagree
in hard cases, there was, I think, more sense in the trial court's instincts than the
Supreme Court-looking at the world only through the twisted prism of "warrant
requirement" doctrine-acknowledged.
The trial court's approach aimed to bring the decedent into the Fourth
Amendment frame. The Supreme Court, by contrast, failed to do this-indeed, it
failed even to tell us her name.43 If James Flippo's consent would have made the
search reasonable, as the Court admits, what about Cheryl Flippo's consent? She
too had a lawful right to the premises (unlike, perhaps, the dead officer killed in
Mincey's apartment).' Had she been able to whisper, "Avenge me," to the police
before her life ended, would this have been enough? Might we infer her implied
consent from her very body? These questions seems less outlandish when we
recall that the key issue of "consent" here is not whether persons have waived their
rights, but whether a search might be "reasonable" overall in light of the signs and
signals greeting the police.
41. Midway between Mincey's facts and Flippo's facts are those of Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S.
17 (1984) (per curiam), also decided without briefing or argument. To the extent Thompson went beyond
Mincey, my criticism of Flippo applies to it too; but Flippo went well beyond even Thompson. Flippo cited
Thompson, but theJustices, forgood epistemic reasons, have insisted that "unargued summary dispositions"
are not entitled to full precedential weight. See, e.g., Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62,76 (1979) (plurality
opinion, per Rehnquist, J.).
42. Flippo, 528 U.S. at 14.
43. See supra note 28. Cf. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 70-95 (1987) (calling upon judges to listen for and be moved by the
voices of actual human beings and the stories of the silenced).
44. The justification for the consent "exception" to the "warrantrequirement" is not based on waiver
of the defendant's rights, but on the fact that consent-even by someone other than the defendant-can make
a search reasonable, a point made clear by the post-Mincey case of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
183-86 (1990). Of course, this is an open recognition that the ultimate Fourth Amendment touchstone is
reasonableness, not warrants.
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This brings us to the most troubling part of Flippo: namely, the Court's easy
embrace of the exclusionary rule as the proper response to Fourth Amendment
violations, even in cases of violent crime. Under this rule, crime victims are
revictimized when those who hurt them walk free, grinning, because evidence is
suppressed. 5 Nothing in the Constitution's text, history, or structure supports this
as the most plausible reading of the document. (Though there are many hard
questions of interpretation, there are also easy ones.) The text nowhere calls for
exclusion, and a close reading in fact reveals that it presupposes civil remedies for
innocent searchees rather than criminal exclusions for guilty ones: Tort law and
property law make us "secure in [our] persons, houses, papers, and effects." '
Historically, the Amendment built on prominent paradigm cases of civil damages;
no court in America, state or federal, ever excluded on Fourth Amendment-like
grounds for the first hundred years after Independence. When exclusion
eventually came into Court doctrine, it did so under an erroneous Lochner-era
fusion of the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause, a fusion that has since been properly repudiated. Structurally, exclusion
warps the general architecture of the Bill of Rights, several of whose provisions
were designed to insure that truth will out at trials, even if defendants prefer
otherwise. In short: Nowhere does the document embrace exclusion of this sort,
and in several places the document attests to the importance of truth-seeking and
reliability.
What "We the People" have said in the document makes more sense than
what the Justices have said in the doctrine. To the extent that the exclusionary rule
is claimed to deter violations, it is a bad fit; and no wonder-it was not originally
designed by Lochner-era judges with this goal in mind. (For example, it works
only when cops find evidence, and thus offers no protection for a person known
to be innocent yet whom the cops seek to harass. It does nothing to cure police
brutality and many other forms of unreasonable action that have no causal link to
evidence-finding. It is not properly tailored to the actual scope of the violation and
imposes direct and sometimes massive demoralization costs on faultless victims.)
Other remedial systems, closely tracking the Founders' paradigm cases, can offer
more and better deterrence, at less social cost.47 Exclusion is also said merely to
restore the status quo ante, to prevent government from profiting from its own
wrong. Had the government not unconstitutionally intruded, the argument runs,
the evidence never would have come to light, and so it should be suppressed. This
argument fails, both normatively and factually. Normatively, society should not
return stolen goods to a thief. Rather, government properly restores these goods
45. See CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 23, 1999, at 5A (letter to the editor written by the victim's
mother, Mary Jewell) ("I am appalled by the Supreme Court's decision. This is very upsetting. It causes
her family more pain and grief.... This whole situation is a nightmare and now it starts all over again");
id. Oct. 25, 1999 (letter written by victim's sister, Anita Jewell Pratt) ("The evidence convicted him. Why
should we have to go through that hell again?").
46. U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
47. For details, see Amar, Criminal Procedure, supra note 36 at 26-31, 40-45, 155-60.
to the rightful owner, even if government finds them in an unconstitutional
search. 4" If the government finds a kidnap victim, it should never give her back
to her captor. It may retain illegal drugs and other contraband taken from drug
dealers, and likewise it need not forego the use of evidentiary fruits to which it has
a legal right. (As a general matter, the "public ... has a right to every man's
evidence.")49 Factually-and here we return to Flippo-exclusion often occurs even
when the government clearly would have found the evidence anyway. Assume for
argument's sake that a warrant was required on the facts of Flippo. What
magistrate in the world would have denied such a request? Wouldn't a warrant
have automatically been issued, and if so, wouldn't the cops have found the photos
anyway? How, then, is exclusion proper? Where is the causation? Doctrine has
never answered-or even asked-this question.
To be sure, Flippo is a tiny case, as Supreme Court cases go. But the case
vividly illustrates a domain where doctrine seems far afield of the document.
More generally, in Flippo's small mirror, we see a Court that appears
insufficiently deliberative, enamored of its own past pronouncements (which it
tends to overread and treat as holy writ), and less wise than the document itself.
The Court seems more concerned about affirming its own status than
understanding the document it is charged with enforcing. The Court also seems
insensitive to the gender issues raised by its dubious deployment of the
Constitution in this case, and in criminal procedure cases more generally. Men
are more likely to be violent offenders; women more likely their victims.' Flippo
was a case about the violence done to a woman by a man, and the woman's voice
was not heard. In the cabin, and in the Court, Cheryl Flippo was silenced.
B. Rights, Structure, and Fairness
"K.M.," a teenager sexually abused by her step-father, was also silenced by
the Court last Term." The sexual assaults occurred from 1991 to 1995, and in
1997, Texas prosecuted the step-father, Scott Carmell, based on K.M.'s
uncorroborated testimony.52 The jury believed K.M. and found Carmell guilty
beyond reasonable doubt on fifteen separate counts.53 Because Texas had recently
48. This result cannot simply be explained by the fact that to restore goods to the thief would be to abet
an ongoing crime. If the thief gives the stolen goods to an innocent third party as a present, government may
nonetheless take the goods away and restore them to the rightful owner. The issue is not merely one of
prevention, but of rectification and restitution.
49. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,50 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950)); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, Evidence § 2192, at 70 (John T. McNaughten, ed.,
1961).
50. See generally Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U.CHi. L. REV. 453, 507-09 (1992). Many prominent cases have involved
men who have killed or raped women or girls. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981 (1984); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). There was, perhaps, another gender issue
implicated by Flippo, involving the precise nature of the photos. Nothing in the Court's analysis, however,
turned on this possible wrinkle.
5I. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
52. Id. at 516-18.
53. Id. at 516.
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reformed its evidence laws, Carmell claimed that K.M.'s testimony, regardless of
how persuasive it might be, could never suffice to convict on four of these counts.'
In an opinion by Justice Stevens over a dissent by Justice Ginsburg, a closely
divided Court agreed, holding that the Constitution required the jury to ignore
what K.M. had said under oath."
The Court's particular five-to-four line-up was unprecedented; never before
or since have Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer joined together
against the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg.' Rarely
do we find both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in dissent. " And the issue before
the Court, implicating matters of both rights and structure, offers a good
laboratory for measuring the document against the doctrine.
The case pivoted on the fact that, when the four relevant incidents of sexual
abuse occurred, Texas had in place an old law providing that certain sexual assault
defendants could never be convicted merely on the testimony of the victims. 8 In
these cases, there also had to be some physical evidence, or some timely statement
or "outcry" by the victim-for example, to a friend, a relative, a counselor, or a
doctor-to confirm that she was not later making things up.' Texas changed this
law in 1993, and when it prosecuted Carmell in 1997, it applied the newer law.'
Carmell claimed that this application violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the
Court agreed.
61
This result, I think, would puzzle-if not shock-most citizens. Texas did not
change the basic rules of criminal conduct. It has been criminally wrong to abuse
one's stepdaughter since time immemorial. Texas merely changed the way this
crime could be reliably proved in court. Once upon a time, females were not
deemed sufficiently believable, but today we should treat them as no less believable
than males. Applying these enlightened ideas about female credibility to all
proceedings is not impermissibly ex post facto. The crime is committing the
sexual assault itself, not getting caught.62 Texas only changed the rules about
getting caught, not about the crime itself.
54. Id. at 520.
55. Id. at 552-53.
56. The point is confirmed by examining the statistics compiled at the back of The Harvard Law
Review Supreme Court issues for the 1994 through 1999 terms.
57. Last year, for example, these two Justices were both in dissent only twice, in Carmell, 529 U.S. at
553 and in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,475 (2000).
58. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 516-17.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 519. The new law did not completely eliminate all outcry requirements-a complexity
I shall initially sidestep to simplify exposition, but that I shall squarely confront later in this section. See
infra text accompanying notes 84-85.
61. See id. at 552.
62. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 625 (1984); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357 (1985). If the "crime" were getting
caught-being proved in court to have done wrong-then all adjudication would border on ex post facto,
making people criminals rather than finding them to be so.
Here too, the citizens are wiser than the Justices, who have taken a text that
came from the populace and read it in an odd way that fails to do justice to the
basic instincts of the American People in whose name this text speaks. A proper
documentarian analysis would proceed as follows: We the People have embraced
a document with not one, but two Ex Post Facto Clauses-one limiting the federal
government and the other limiting the states.63 Only two other sets of prohibitions
in the entire original Constitution are given similar status: the bans on bills of
attainder and the bans on titles of nobility.' From these facts alone, we may
properly deduce that we deal here with what the People, from the beginning, have
deemed a basic principle that should command near universal assent in a free
republic. The core principle is this: The legislature may not make conduct that
was wholly innocent at time TI retroactively criminal at time T2. Otherwise, the
legislature could target known political opponents (who cannot change their past
actions), trespass on ground properly judicial (by acting to punish known persons
for what they have already done), and deprive citizens of fair notice of the basic
norms of conduct they must observe. The Ex Post Facto Clauses stand back to
back with the Bill of Attainder Clauses, which reflect a similar cluster of
concerns.65 These facts in turn confirm that we have properly deduced the core
principle, and its basic rationales. Further confirmation comes from the basic
structure of the document as a whole, with its obvious emphasis on protection of
political dissenters, separation of powers, due process, and fair notice. Historical
evidence from Founding debates and pamphlets and Revolution-era state
constitutions proves that ex post facto laws were widely defined as laws
retroactively criminalizing conduct that was innocent when done.' Such laws
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed" by
Congress); See id. at § 10 ("No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, [or] ex post facto Law").
64. Today the category is much broader as a result of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against
states and the reverse incorporation of equal protection principles against the federal government.
65. For extended analysis, see Akhil Reed Amar, Attainer and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REV. 203, 208-21 (1996).
66. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 379 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1966) ("[T]hey shall not cause that to be a crime which is no crime.") (paraphrasing remarks
of Gouverneur Morris, James Wilson, and William Samuel Johnson); THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511-12
(Clinton Rossitered., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton) ("The subjecting of men to punishment for things which,
when they were done, were breaches of no law."); I The Debates on the Constitution 396 (Bernard Bailyn
ed., 1993) (attributed to James Iredell) ("What [a man] does innocently and safely to-day, according to the
laws of his country, cannot be tortured into guilt and danger to-morrow."); MD. CONST. of 1776
(Declaration of Rights), art. XV ("[Rietrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of
such laws, and by them only declared criminal."); N.C. CONST. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights), art. XXIV
(same); cf Del. Declaration of Rights of 1776, § II (condemning "retrospective laws, punishing offences
committed before the existence of such laws" but not using words "ex post facto"); MASS. CONST. of 1780,
pt. I, art. XXVI (condemning "Laws made to punish actions done before the existence of such laws, and
which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws" but not using words "ex post facto"). These
formulations mesh well with and may have been borrowed from Blackstone, whose views on the proper
meaning of ex post facto influenced leading Framers. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supra note 66, at 448-49 (remarks of John Dickenson reporting to his colleagues on Blackstone's
definition). With Blackstone on their side, leading Federalists were on solid ground in denying Anti-
Federalist claims that the Ex Post Facto Clauses would prevent certain useful retroactive civil laws. But cf
N. H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I. Art. XXIII (condemning all "retrospective laws" even in "civil causes," but
not using words "ex post facto"). The words of Blackstone himself perfectly cohere with the documentary
framework that I propose:
There is a still more unreasonable method [than Caligula's], which is called the making of laws
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were widely condemned as repulsive to all right-thinking folk-"contrary to the
first principles of the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation."'67
What Texas did, however, was not repulsive at all, and would not be so seen
by the American People at any point in our history. Why, then, did the Court
condemn Texas? First, the Court defined the Ex Post Facto Clause very broadly,
and then applied it quite rigidly. This is a classic two-step move in many areas of
modern doctrine, but often it reflects poor judgment." It is often proper to
construe a given clause as embracing both a hard core rule, and a broader
principle. But the penumbral principle cannot always be sensibly enforced with
the same rigidity as the core rule itself.
The Court took its cue from Justice Chase's exposition of the Ex Post Facto
Clause in his separate opinion in the 1798 case, Calder v. Bull.' Chase defined
expostfacto laws to encompass, not just laws that make actions criminal that were
innocent when done (our "core" rule), but also all laws that retroactively increase
the offense-grade or sentence, and all laws that "alter[] the legal rules of evidence,
and receive[] less or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender."'7 Many later cases,
in dicta, have quoted Chase's definition, and the Carmell Court found this
dispositive." What Texas did, said the Court, was a textbook case of Chase's final
prong, altering the rules of evidence in order to convict the offender with less than
would have been required when he did the deed.72
Though this appeal to a 1798 case may look like originalism-enough so to
win the votes of Justices Thomas and Scalia-it, in fact, exemplifies modern
ex post facto, when after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed the legislator then for the
first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who
committed it. Here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when
it was done, should afterwards be converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no
cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and
unjust.
I William Blackstone, Commentaries *46 (emphasis altered). Note that the first italicized phrase did not
appear until Blackstone's second edition, published in 1766.
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 82 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (J. Madison). For similar descriptions,
see id. No. 84, at 5 11-12 ("most formidable instrument[] of tyranny") (A. Hamilton); 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 66, at 376 (remarks of Oliver Ellsworth and James
Wilson) ("void of themselves" and contrary to "first principles of Legislation"); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 66, at 165 (pamphlet by Oliver Ellsworth) ("tyrannical"); I
William Blackstone, Commentaries *46 ("cruel and unjust" and "still more unreasonable" than what
Caligula did); MD. CONSTof 1776, (Declaration of Rights), art. XV ("oppressive, unjust, and incompatible
with liberty"); N.C. CONST. of 1776, (Declaration of Rights), art. XXIV (same); Del. Declaration of Rights
of 1776, § II ("oppressive and unjust," though not using words "ex post facto"); MAss. CONST. of 1780,
pt. I, art. XXIV ("unjust, oppressive, and inconsistent with the principles of a free government," but not
using words "ex post facto").
68. For a similar move in the free-speech context, see United States v. Playboy Ent, Group, 529 U.S.
803, 879 (2000).
69. 3 U.S (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
70. See id. at 390 (separate opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis altered).
71. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 525 (2000).
72. See id. at 530-34.
doctrinalism and illustrates some of its pathologies. As an epistemic matter,
Chase is hardly the most surefooted guide to the document-the man, after all, was
impeached for his constitutional clumsiness-and later Court dicta parroting Chase
is not particularly deliberative. But the current Court simply points to Chase and
later dicta, treating the issue as dictated by precedent instead of giving us a careful
account of the relevant constitutional values at stake. Tellingly, Chase's definition
of expostfacto was not put forth by anyone before the Constitution's ratification.73
Rather than insisting that every law that modifies the rules of evidence is
exactly the same as one that makes a wholly innocent act retroactively criminal,
it makes more sense to say that some evidence-altering laws might indeed violate
the spirit-the animating principles-of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Imagine a law
that retroactively imposes the burden of proof on defendants for a given
affirmative defense in a regulatory context where reliance issues are large and the
conduct in question was not malum in se.74 This could indeed be a case of political
targeting, of legislative overreaching, or of improper frustration of legitimate
reliance interests and the fair notice ideal. Not all evidence-altering laws,
however, are like this. If lie-detector or DNA tests at time TI are unreliable, the
law might forbid these tests from being introduced against defendants. But if
technology improves, and the law changes at time T2, tests done after T2 should
properly be admissible even for crimes that occurred prior to T2. The lie-detector
analogy perfectly describes what Texas did. At time TI, the testimony of females
in certain sexual assault cases was seen as uniquely unreliable-so that it was
treated much worse than most other testimony-but we now know better, At time
T2 Texas finally realizes that this testimony is not different in principle from any
other testimony, and should be treated the same way. For any other crime, a single
uncorroborated witness can suffice; so the same rule should apply to these sexual
assault cases. And this testimony should be immediately admissible, as were the
new-technology lie-detector and DNA tests in our hypothetical.
Justice Stevens has no good purposive or principled answer to this line of
analysis, but he does have an ace up his sleeve, and he plays it with fanfare. To
illustrate an impermissible evidence-altering law, Justice Chase, following a 1792
English treatise, cited the trial of Sir John Fenwick in 1696.7' At every tight spot
in his opinion, Stevens plays the Fenwick card.76 The trial, he implies, was a
paradigm case of ex post facto violation, and, he insists, is on all fours with
Carmell's case.77 Fenwick committed treasonous acts in 1695, and was tried in
73. Instead, the leading definition was the core rule that I have offered here. See supra note 66.
74. I am assuming here that the new rule, applicable only to affirmative defenses, does not violate the
Winship line of cases; otherwise, it could not be applied even prospectively. See In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358,367-68 (1970) (holding that elements of case-in-chief must be proved by prosecutor beyond reasonable
doubt); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1977) (holding Winship inapplicable to certain
affirmative defenses). On the importance of the distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum
offenses where issues of fair notice are concerned, see Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law is an
Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv. 127, 129 (1997).
75. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 389.
76. See generally Carnell, 529 U.S. 513.
77. See id. at 526-30.
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1696. 7" At the time of his crime, the general rule was that a treason conviction
required two witnesses. The prosecution could muster only one, but Parliament
said that one would be good enough, and Fenwick was found guilty.79
Alas, Stevens' ace is in fact a joker. No one in 1787-89 ever invoked
Fenwick's trial as an example of an impermissible ex post facto law. Not that
Americans would have found Parliament's actions in that case acceptable.
Regardless of retroactivity, the Framers believed that, in the absence of a
confession, treason should always require two witnesses, as they made clear
elsewhere in the Constitution."° Fenwick was tried.by the legislature itself, in a
manner violative of anti-attainder principles the Founders held dear. Moreover,
Fenwick' s case raised serious issues of legislative targeting of political opponents
(issues far afield from what Texas did to Carmell). Thus, there was much to
condemn in Fenwick's case that has no bearing on Carmell's.
Stevens' over-reliance on Chase's passing reference to Fenwick reflects a
much larger problem of doctrinal self-absorption, in which the Court creates ever
more intricate doctrinal structures but tends to miss the big ideas of the document.
A more holistic documentarian approach to Carmell would try to look at the facts
of the case in a larger context. Is there legislative targeting here, in which
lawmakers are singling out known enemies for hostile treatment? This is an
obvious concern of both the attainder and the ex post facto bans, but it is minimal
when victims of assault have not spoken out, and thus even the legislature does not
know the names of those whom these victims may accuse. Though not purely
prospective, the evidence-reform legislation is adopted behind a suitable veil of
ignorance. This alone decisively distinguishes Carmell's case from Fenwick's
where Parliament adopted an ad hoc rule applicable only to Fenwick after the facts
came to light. Is there legislative over-reaching of the judicial function here?
This is probably a greater concern at the federal level, where the Ex Post Facto
Clause interacts with many other separation of powers provisions. But at the state
level, this particular aspect of the expostfacto ideamay have less bite, because the
Constitution generally does not require that states follow a rigid separation of
powers on the federal model. If Texas courts, acting on their own, had decided to
recognize a common-law offense of sexual assault, and had allowed
uncorroborated testimony to suffice, wouldn't this have been permissible?
Wouldn't it be permissible for Texas courts to apply this common-law
modification retroactively? If so, the reason in part is that we think sexual assault
is malum in se, and there are very few legitimate reliance interests at stake." If
Texas courts could have chosen to do what they did in Carmell, why is it a federal
concern that they did it in partnership with their state legislature?
78. See The Proceedings Against Sir John Fenwick Upon a Bill of Attainder for High Treason 40
(1702).
79. See id.
80. See U.S. CONST. art. Il1, § 3, cl. I ("No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.").
81. See Kahan, supra note 74, at 129.
Another holistic question: Is there any basic unfairness here? After all, the
main idea is to establish justice. The Court majority identifies no basic unfairness,
and in a post-Nuremberg world, most Americans do not think that using new
procedures to prove that bad men have done bad things that were always wrong
is intolerably unfair or improperly retroactive. But there is, I suggest, a basic
unfairness in silencing K.M., and treating her as an inherently untrustworthy
witness.
This brings us to the final holistic question: Why wasn't the old Texas law
unconstitutional? Documentarian analysis focuses not just on the Founding, but
on later constitutional moments. Wasn't Texas' old "outcry" rule an affront to
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendment ideals of women's equality? After all, no
comparable rule existed for male victims of nonsexual assault. Unlike the two-
witness rule at issue in Fenwick's case and at the heart of the Constitution's
Treason Clause, Texas's old rule-dating back to an era in which women did not
vote-in effect singled out some persons on basis of their birth status and said that
they-uniquely in our criminal justice system-are not fully reliable witnesses. 2
This was a kind of obvious status insult to equal citizenship of women. More than
that, it denied them the genuine equal protection of laws, a concept that at its core
protected the rights of victims to be equally protected by government from
criminals. The Fourteenth Amendment thus barred a state from looking the other
way when white Klansmen murdered and pillaged black folk." Texas's old law
was also reminiscent of the infamous Black Codes that said that whites could
never be convicted on the testimony of blacks.' 4 Had this old law been struck
down by the state judiciary on state or federal equality grounds, surely this ruling
would have full retroactive effect. Thus, the old law was itself no law at all; and
the true law applicable when Carmell assaulted K.M. was one that treated her as
a full and equal citizen. Therefore, there was nothing remotely impermissible or
genuinely retroactive about what Texas did to Carmell. The only real
constitutional violation was of the rights of K.M. and others like her-a violation
Texas has yet to fully cure. (The state has retained vestiges of the outcry rule in
other parts of its legal code.) However, not a single Justice identified Texas' true
violation or openly discussed the obvious issue of women's equality.
C. VA WA
Which brings us to the last of our trilogy of cases about male violence against
females. Christy Brzonkala brought suit in federal court against two men who, she
claimed, assaulted and raped her." Her suit was based on a 1994 congressional
82. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. at 557-58 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing history of
Texas law). Although modern versions of this statute are formally gender-neutral, the law had its origins
in an explicitly gendered set of rules about "female[s] alleged to have been seduced." See id. at 558 (citing
1891 version of Texas statute).
83. See generally Jacobus Ten Broek, EQUAL UNDER LAW 157-97 (1965); Steven J. Heyman, The
First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L. J. 507
(1991).
84. See, e.g., Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME, AND THE LAW 36-41 (1997).
85. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1756 (2000).
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civil rights law, the Violence Against Women Act, which, among other things,
created a federal civil cause of action for victims of gender-motivated violence.'
By a five-to-four vote, the Court once again sided against an apparent female
victim of male violence. 7 Even if everything Brzonkala said was true, it did not
matter. Congress had no business enacting the civil rights provision at issue.
So says the doctrine, per Chief Justice Rehnquist."5 The document, per the
American People, says something different, and more admirable: Women are
equal citizens, and Congress has broad power to affirm the rights of equal citizens
against social structures and forces-even private ones-that threaten a regime of
equal citizenship.
The documentary key to the case, then, is not the Commerce Clause, as the
four dissenters seemed to think. 9 Yes, violence against women may be an
economic issue of sorts; it is also a national problem-that is, a problem
everywhere. But is it truly a federal problem-that is, an inter-state problem, a
problem among or between the several states, a problem involving genuine
interjurisdictional spillovers? If not, then the majority has a plausible argument
that the Interstate Commerce Clause is an inapt basis for federal power."
. Candid supporters of VAWA can concede that the issue of violence against
women is not mainly an economic one, or chiefly an interstate one. The deepest
concern is not about gross domestic product, or about things that cross or spill over
state lines.9' Indeed, the main goal may not even be to ensure women's access to
courtrooms. After all, state courts are open to hear garden variety assault and
other tort cases. State criminal courts have been inhospitable to women victims
of male violence, but so have federal criminal courts (beginning with the Supreme
Court itself, as we have already begun to glimpse). The inhospitability has less
to do with state courts as such and more to do with inherent features of criminal
courts. Criminal courts, federal no less than state, deny full agency to women
victims, who must rely on professional prosecutors to take the lead. Criminal
courts, federal no less than state, also feature a variety of rules, from the
outlandish exclusionary rule to the proper proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt rule,
that can make it difficult for victims to prevail, especially in he-said-she-said
settings. To overcome the inherent limits of criminal proceedings, it is necessary
86. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (supp. 2000).
87. See Morrison, at 1756.
88. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Souter
authored the lead dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Breyer also wrote a
dissent joined in part by Justices Souter and Ginsburg and entirely by Justice Stevens.
89. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1760-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
90. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce...
among the several States"). For more analysis of the distinction between national and federal problems, see
Brest, et. al., supra note 25, at 470-71, 480, 532-33.
91. I mean to define spillovers broadly so as to encompass, for example, goods, services, pollution
molecules, water, air, animals, and persons that cross state lines. For a case next term that may probe the
limits of congressional power over inter-state affairs that are not narrowly economic, see Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001).
to ensure that the victim herself can sue in a civil proceeding, but it is less clear
why this proceeding needs to be a federal one if the only goal is to give women
agency and a fair chance to recover damages.92
In other words, VAWA is largely symbolic. That does not make it
unimportant or unconstitutional. We live by symbols. The Constitution itself is
one of our largest symbols. It helps bind Americans together, in part by affirming
our most precious ideals. That is why it is so sad to watch the Court take
admirable ideals and render them obscure or obtuse or contemptible. The ideal of
equal national citizenship for all, regardless of birth status, is one of the
Constitution's most profound precepts, and this is the ideal that VAWA
symbolically affirms. VAWA calls certain acts of violence not merely random,
private assaults, but parts of a larger historically-rooted system of insult and
degradation. VAWA labels that system of insult a civil rights issue, an equality
issue.
The Chief Justice says that Congress lacks power to do this under the
Reconstruction Amendments.9" In part, he appeals to the "language and purpose"
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which lead him to embrace "the time-honored
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state
action."' Precedents from the period "[s]hortly after the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted"95 confirm this reading, he says. Foremost among these precedents
are the 1883 Civil Rights Cases," in which the Court invalidated those parts of
Charles Sumner's 1875 Civil Rights Act that banned racial discrimination by
innkeepers, common carriers, theaters, and the like. These cases are especially
valuable epistemically, says the Chief Justice:
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions stems not
only from the length of time they have been on the books, but also from
the insight attributable to the Members of the Court at the time. Every
member had been appointed by President Lincoln, Grant, Garfield, or
Arthur-and each of their judicial appointees obviously had intimate
knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.97
There are a few basic facts about the document and the doctrine that the Chief
omits. The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment has no explicit state-
action requirement in its language: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
92. One answer might be that state evidentiary rules, even in civil cases, continue to tilt against woman
alleging sexual assault. Another answer would focus on rules in place in some states preventing women
from suing their husbands generally, or for some kinds of marital rapes. A third answer might be that unless
a law specially names violence against women as a wrong, certain subspecies of assault will be casually
dismissed by some jurors as "private" matters rather than serious torts. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 176 1,
n. 7, 1772-73 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1755-59.
94. Id. at 1756.
95. Id.
96. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
97. 120 S. Ct. at 1756.
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of the State wherein they reside."98 This sentence was introduced to overrule the
not-so-wise Supreme Court, whose lead opinion in the Dred Scott case proclaimed
that blacks could never be "citizens. '"" Ordinary Americans confronting the
language of the first sentence in 1866-68, and deciding whether to support or
oppose the Amendment, understood Taney' s opinion as the paradigm case of what
this sentence aimed to repudiate. Taney's opinion focused not merely on the
governmental aspects of citizenship-state action-but on the broader sociological
and public meaning of the concept. "Blacks," said Taney in (in)famous language,
could not be citizens because they were widely regarded by the white race (and not
merely by government) as "beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race," with "no rights which the white man was bound to
respect""-the white man, not just the white government. Thus when the
Constitution explicitly repudiated Taney, it did so with words that seemed to
suggest that the Congress, which was explicitly given sweeping, Prigg-ish and
McCulloch-like enforcement power in Section 5,"'1 would have power to enact
certain laws designed to affirm that blacks were equal citizens, worthy of respect
and dignity. Such laws could not compel whites to invite blacks over to their
dinner parties-truly private consensual relations were outside the ambit of
citizenship-but could regulate larger non-governmental systems of exclusion in
places such as hotels, theaters, and trains. Such laws could also try to protect
blacks from racially-motivated violence, and thereby affirm that blacks did indeed
have rights that white men (and not merely governments) were bound to respect.
This, at any rate, was the theory under which the Reconstruction Congress
adopted sundry civil rights laws that the Court later struck down. Many of these
Congressmen had been leading architects of the Amendment itself. Why doesn't
William Rehnquist accord these men any epistemic respect? Founders like James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who lived and died as slaveholders, are treated
with reverence by the Court (even though Jefferson was not even in America at the
Founding). Why are Reconstructors like John Bingham and Charles Sumner,
crusaders for racial justice, treated with so much less respect?
And what about the first Justice Harlan? After all, he dissented in the CiVil
Rights Cases, arguing that Congress had broad Prigg-ish power to address even
certain private conduct,"c and that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
99. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
100. Id. at 407.
101. See generally Engel, supra note 25; The Section 5 language granting Congress "to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this" Amendment was consciously modeled on the famous passage
in McCulloch glossing the Necessary and Proper Clause: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate ... are constitutional." McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819) (emphasis added).
102. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[P]rior to the amendments, Congress, with the sanction of this court, passed the most stringent
laws-operating directly and primarily upon States, and their officers and agents, as well as upon
individuals-in vindication of slavery and the right of the master.... [So now may Congress,]
Amendment had no state-action requirement." 3 This is the same Harlan who later
dissented in Plessy. If he was right in Plessy, perhaps he might have been right
here. To pass over him in silence, as Rehnquist does, is to disrespect a great
Justice. In other opinions, Harlan insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states; that the federal government was
bound by the principle of equal citizenship (a kind of reverse-incorporation); that
free expression meant more than the ban on prior restraints; that the Bill of Rights
protected brown-skinned folk in the territories; and that the Court could not simply
ignore the Fifteenth Amendment in the face of massive southern
disfranchisement." 4 In all of these contexts, Harlan's opinions-often in
dissent-have stood the test of time better than the majority opinions of his Gilded
Age colleagues whom the Chief now privileges.
Here we begin to see the wages of a standard narrative presenting the Court
as heroic and downplaying the document. None of the other Justices see the
serious problems with Rehnquist's basic storyline. Most casebooks omit Prigg, °5
gloss over Dred Scott,"° and fail to teach students enough about men like John
Bingham and Charles Sumner. Lawyers are dimly aware of Plessy'° in the
background, but focus on Brown"°8 in the foreground. The many failings of the
Court in the Gilded Age are largely repressed-much of this is simply omitted from
by legislation of a like primary and direct character, guard, protect, and secure the freedom
established, and the most essential right of the citizenship granted, by the constitutional
amendments. . . . [T]he national legislature may, without transcending the limits of the
Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship, what it
did, with the sanction of this court, for the protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of
fugitive slaves.
109 U.S. at 53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
103. The first clause of the first section... is of a distinctly affirmative character ....
The citizenship thus acquired ... may be protected, not alone by the judicial branch of the
government, but by congressional legislation of a primary direct character; this, because the
power of Congress is not restricted to the enforcement of prohibitions upon State laws or State
action. It is, in terms, distinct and positive, to enforce "the provisions of this article" of
amendment; not simply those of a prohibitive character, but theprovisions-all of the provisions,
affirmative and prohibitive, of the amendment. It is, therefore, a grave misconception to
suppose that the fifth section of the amendment has reference exclusively to express prohibitions
upon State laws or State action ....
... [C]ongress is not restricted to the enactment of laws adapted to counteract and redress the
operation of State legislation, or the action of State officers, of the character prohibited by the
amendment. It was perfectly well known that the great danger to the equal enjoyment by
citizens of their rights, as citizens, was to be apprehended not altogether from unfriendly State
legislation, but from the hostile action of corporations and individuals in the states. And it is to
be presumed that it was intended, by that section [five], to clothe Congress with power and
authority to meet that danger.
Id. at 46-47, 54 (emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,546 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (incorporation);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114-27 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (incorporation); Gibson v.
Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565,591 (1896) (reverse incorporation); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463-
65 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (free expression); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 375-91(1901)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (territories); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 226-49 (1903) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (territories); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154-58 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(territories); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 504 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (black disfranchisement).
105. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
106. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
107. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
108. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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casebooks. And the irony of Rehnquist's presenting post-Redemption cases
seeking to undo Reconstruction as rendered "shortly after the Fourteenth
Amendment" is, I suspect, lost on most readers.
Coming from William Rehnquist, this crabbed view of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not wholly unexpected, for he has never been a particularly
sympathetic or generous reader of Reconstruction. What is most surprising-and
disheartening-is that no one on the Court squarely challenges Rehnquist on
Reconstruction (though Justice Breyer raises an eyebrow)." 9 The debate instead
focuses on the Commerce Clause.
Instead of talking about Commerce Clause issues far afield from women's
equality, the dissenters would have done better to begin with the Citizenship
Clause" o and explain how gender-motivated violence against women can pose a
threat to equal citizenship in a manner analogous (though not identical) to the
ways that other power structures have threatened the equal citizenship of blacks.
The dissenters might have noted that race and sex are not isomorphic; and that in
the case of equal citizenship based on sex, it is important to read the Fourteenth
Amendment in light of the much later Nineteenth. But in the case of both race
and sex, the dissenters could have argued, Congress may properly act to dismantle
what it plausibly perceives to be large social structures creating and sustaining
conditions of unequal citizenship, in which some citizens are systematically
disrespected or mistreated on the basis of birth status. In the context of both race
and sex, government has helped maintain these structures, by its actions and
inactions. In the case of race, the Black Codes, Jim Crow, lynchings, and
disfranchisement have loomed large. In the case of sex, government has created
marriage laws that left women's property and bodies largely at the mercy of men"'.
and has erected unjustified obstacles to rape prosecution, such as the "outcry"
requirement. Through such laws, government has historically invested men with
an improper sense of entitlement over women's bodies.
But the past involvement of government is probably not necessary to uphold
109. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1778-79 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Only Justice
Stevens joined this part of Breyer's dissent. Id.
110. In emphasizing this clause, and its proper application to certain direct citizen-citizen relations apart
from state action, I stand on the shoulders of the great Charles Black. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONsTrrUIONAL LAW 51-66 (1969).
111. For example, at common law, a man could rape his wife with impunity, and subject her to physical
punishment. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996); Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990); Robin L. West, Toward an Abolitionist
Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111,138-50 (1991). Husbands also had
general legal control over their wives' earnings and property, see Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First
Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-80, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994);
Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives 'Rights to Earnings, 1860-
1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994).
congressional action; it merely strengthens the case. 112 Though the documentarian
issues are not free from all doubt, the best reading of the Constitution as a whole
is probably this: To vindicate the vision of the Fourteenth Amendment (read
through the prism of the Nineteenth), Congress may pass expressive laws
affirming women's equal status and citizenship, making clear to all that women
have rights that men are bound to respect. Congress's power is not plenary-wholly
plenary power is hard to reconcile with the basic structure of enumerated power,
which the Reconstruction Amendments accept rather than repudiate. But where
Congress can honestly be understood as affirming equal citizenship for those who
have historically been denied equality on the basis of birth-status, judicial review
of enumerated power should be no less deferential than in Prigg"3 or
McCulloch,"4 on which the Fourteenth Amendment's supporters justifiably
relied."5
A documentary dissent along the lines suggested would not have been
incontrovertible. But it would have better illuminated the central civil rights
issues that Congress sought to vindicate, and the basic themes of the Constitution
as a holistic document. Indeed, the dissenters might properly have noted the
obvious democracy deficit created when a Court with only two women on it (only
one of whom joins the majority) relies on old cases from an era in which no
women voted, glossing even earlier constitutional texts, to strike down a post-
Nineteenth Amendment law that a great many women have strongly supported.
III. VIOLENCE AGAINST POSTERITY: PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION
Abortion is perhaps America's most agonizing legal and moral issue. It has
divided the country, and last term it divided the Court deeply and down the
middle. In Stenberg v. Carhart,"6 five Justices voted to overturn Nebraska's ban
on partial birth abortions; four dissenters sharply disagreed.' Eight Justices
wrote-more than in any case last term, or indeed, in the last decade."' Some of
the opinions contain passages that are gut-wrenching in their graphic descriptions
of late-term abortions.'"' Nothing that anyone could say about abortion law-on the
Court, in the Pepperdine Law Review, or anywhere else-could soothe all sides oi
112. For a graceful and forceful argument that VAWA was a proper response to governmental violations,
see Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala
v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (2000).
113. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
114. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
115. The VAWA section at issue speaks of "persons" rather than citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (b) (1994).
To the extent it sweeps beyond citizen-citizen violence, it may properly be justified by Congress's sweeping
power to regulate and protect aliens.
116. 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
117. Id. Justice Breyer wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and
Ginsburg, each of whom, except Justice Souter, also wrote a short concurrence. Id. at 2604-20. Justices
Thomas and Kennedy wrote the longest dissents-the former joined by the Chief and by Justice Scalia, the
latter joined only by the Chief. Id. at 2623-56. The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia also wrote short
separate dissents. Id. at 2620-23.
118. Last term, the case with the next most opinions (six) was Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054
(2000). To my knowledge, the last time eight or more Justices wrote in a single case was in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), where all nine Justices wrote.
119. E.g., Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2622 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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completely heal the nation's bleeding wounds. But I submit that that doctrine's
discourse, as exemplified by the opinions of the Justices in the majority, is
insensitive and obtuse-more partisan, more cold, less conciliatory, and less wise
than the document itself.
The basic approach of the majority, whether couched in the bland language
of Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court, or the more confrontational prose of
some of the concurring Justices, is that the Court has spoken, and all must obey.
Breyer begins, however, on a far more promising note, cautioning that
"constitutional law must govern a society whose different members sincerely hold
directly opposing views."' 2° So far, so good. What is needed is a focal point, a
common ground, something that respects the valid concerns of both those who
care about women's equality and those who care about unborn human life. And
that focal point, says Breyer, is doctrine: "This Court, in the course of a
generation, has determined and then redetermined that the Constitution offers
basic protection to the woman's right to choose. Roe v. Wade'21; Planned
Parenthood v. Casey'22. We shall not revisit those legal principles. Rather, we
apply them to the circumstances of this case."' 23
There are several problems here. First, exactly where and how and why does
"the Constitution" offer this basic protection? In other words, where is the first
link in the chain of proper constitutional argument connecting Roe's rules to
something actually in the document? In order to apply "legal principles" to new
facts, we need to know the reasons underlying the principles. In the year 2000, it
is hardly a state secret that Roe's exposition was not particularly persuasive, even
to many who applauded its result. Casey built on Roe, without ever explaining
why Roe was right. Now Stenberg builds on Casey and Roe, and critics may justly
feel that this is a shell game with no pea. If all sides are sincerely being asked to
come together in good faith, it is hard to ask them to cohere around Roe simply
because "this Court" keeps incanting it without explaining or justifying it,
constitutionally. "We shall not revisit those legal principles."' 24 Shut up, he
explained. Because I said so.
Second, even if Roe's documentary weaknesses were not so obvious or
important, what Roe said was not particularly wise or sensitive. There is very
little about women's equality in the case; more about the rights of doctors, and
rather a lot about privacy. But to talk about privacy is to beg the question of the
moral status of the fetus.'25 How can all be asked to come together around a
120. Id. at 2604.
121. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
123. Id. (internal citations modified).
124. Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2604.
125. Roe itself acknowledged that a "pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy" and that the
issue before the Court was thus "inherently different" from true privacy cases involving issues like
contraception. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). This acknowledgment renders the opinion's
exposition of abortion as a "privacy" right rooted in these earlier cases, almost self-contradictory. Id. at
152-53. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747, 773-78 (1999).
discourse that simply fails to acknowledge the basic moral insight of one side-that
the fetus is a moral entity? Even if the moral nothingness of the fetus were
obvious to most right-thinking folk when the fetus is a near-microscopic clump of
cells, the issue in Stenberg is very different-late second-trimester abortions of
recognizable humans, with hands, organs, dimensions, senses, brains.'26 When
you prick them, they bleed.
Thus, Roe's privacy talk is not a promising way to find common ground.
What about women's equality? Breyer's opinion contains exactly one mention of
equality, in its opening paragraph: "[M]illions [of Americans] fear that a law that
forbids abortion would condemn many American women to lives that lack dignity,
depriving them of equal liberty and leading those with least resources to undergo
illegal abortions with the attendant risks of death and suffering."'27 On the facts
of Roe, where an old law that no woman voted for banned all abortions, the claims
of women's equality were indeed forceful-especially when we understand how law
has often used women's biology to limit women's prospects and channel them into
circumscribed lives. But the law in Stenberg was quite different. It had been
recently adopted in Nebraska, and in 29 other states, in a process that fully
involved women as political equals. 128 It did not limit early abortions in any way-
any woman wanting to end an unwanted pregnancy early on had complete freedom
to do so. Thus, the law did not compeletely conscript women's bodies or channel
them into narrowly circumscribed lives.'29 As to late term abortions, where the
fetus was much more developed and recognizably human, the law, if narrowly
construed, outlawed only a single procedure, leaving other methods of abortion
unaffected. 30 Moreover, the American Medical Association proclaimed that there
were no situations in which the banned procedure was the only safe and effective
one; safe alternatives were always available.'3 '
The majority counters that, although the alternatives are safe, it is possible to
imagine some situations where the banned procedure might, perhaps, be ever so
slightly safer. 3 2 But where exactly does the Constitution say that the government
may never oblige citizens to undergo some very small risk? If the document does
126. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at Conception," 43
STAN. L. REV. 599 (1991) (discussing fetal development in utero).
127. Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2604.
128. In Nebraska itself, it passed the state legislature by an overwhelming margin among both male and
female legislators. Overall, the vote for it was 45 to t, with three abstentions. 95 NEB. LEGIS. J. 2609
(1997). Among female legislators, twelve voted for it and one abstained. Id. A nationwide Gallup Poll
conducted in the spring of 2000 found that both men and women supported a ban on partial birth abortion
by a margin of more than 2 to I. Conversation with The Gallup Organization, Princeton, N.J. (July 26,
2000).
129. Cf., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REy. 737,784, 794 (1989) (arguing that
privacy is an "anti-totalitarian right" that protects the "freedom not to have one's life too totally determined
by... [the] state").
130. Despite the law's apparent narrow aim, critics claimed that its words in fact swept more broadly
than advertised. The federal courts below construed the statute expansively, and the Supreme Court
majority agreed, over sharp dissent. Federal courts are not the definitive interpreters of state law; and where
possible, statutes should be construed so as to avoid constitutional doubts. Several other states have statutes
with narrower language than Nebraska's; to simplify exposition of the key constitutional issues, I shall thus
assume a clean statute that prohibits only the "D& X" procedure rather than the "D& E" method of
abortion.
131. Stenberg, 120S. Ct. at2612-13.
132. Id. at 2611-12.
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not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, '33 where does it enact Stephen Breyer's
Risk Regulation Manual?"3 Would such a rigid Manual -constitutionalized so
that no legislature could ever properly modify it-be truly wise, given that there is
more to life than maximizing safety? Other values, such as minimizing cruelty,
are also important. If it could be proved that crime victims could be made
marginally safer if we vivisected all murderers, would this gruesome capital
punishment be mandatory? Of course, at some point, where only women are asked
to bear serious risks without strong justification, equality principles should come
into play; but once again, isn't it important, on an equality argument, that many
women across the country have supported the ban on one particularly cruel form
of abortion?'35
The majority tries to sidestep the cruelty question-Casey said nothing about
cruelty, so the Court will assume it away 36-but Justice Stevens addresses it head
on, in a concurrence joined by Justice Ginsburg. All forms of abortion are
cruel-"equally gruesome"-and so distinguishing between them is, in Stevens'
words, "simply irrational."'37 So much, it seems, for trying to be sensitive to
competing moral visions; just dismiss the millions of Americans who disagree
with you as "irrational." Granted, the document itself does sharply condemn
certain things; it is hardly "neutral" on everything. But the things it condemns in
blunt terms, like aristocracy and slavery, generally deserve condemnation. Those
who believe in White Supremacy and Black Codes deserve scorn; those who weep
at partial birth abortion do not. Deep down, Justice Stevens himself must know
this. Would he dismiss as "simply irrational" those who insist that capital
punishment by electric chair should be banned in favor of death by lethal
injection? At some level, all forms of capital punishment are gruesome, but a
society that seeks to minimize barbarism makes fine distinctions. There are laws,
for example, that prohibit mistreatment of corpses. Those who support a ban on
partial birth abortion seek to use the law expressively-to find some way of saying
in law that the unborn child late in a pregnancy is not nothing, that we recognize
it, and respect it, that we seek to minimize its insult and avoid dehumanizing
ourselves even if we allow the mother to end its life.' In this sense, the law itself
sought to protect choice while also expressing society's sense of tragedy.'39 To
133. Lochner v. New York, 25 S. Ct 539, 546 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
134. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 18
(1993).
135. This is not to suggest that a very clear equality violation would always be cured by general support
from the disfavored group; but surely the views of women are relevant where the alleged violation of
women's equality is not so clear.
136. See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2597.
137. Id. at 2617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
138. The method of partial birth abortion can be seen as mocking the natural birth process, imitating it
until the very point of death, with an intact human being largely outside the womb.
139. Some of the. reasons for late-term abortions are themselves quite tragic, involving wanted
pregnancies with late-discovered genetic abnormalities and other heart-breaking scenarios. None of the
Stenberg opinions discusses these issues in any detail.
dismiss this effort to find some common ground as "simply irrational" is
politically obtuse and morally insensitive.' 4°
The rest of Stevens' short concurrence is not much better. He adopts a
dismissive tone towards dissenters, and exults in the fact that Roe's central
holding "has been endorsed by all but 4 of the 17 Justices who have addressed the
issue."'' This seems quite impressive-until one remembers how many Justices
supported, say, censorship for the first 150 years. Past Court opinions are
epistemically valuable, but a properly humble Justice should always be open to the
possibility of past error. Those who want to follow and extend a given precedent
should be prepared to defend it on the merits; and here, Stevens falls short. He
distills Roe's central holding as follows: "the word 'liberty' in the Fourteenth
Amendment includes a woman's right to make this difficult and extremely
personal decision."'42 But of course the document says that "liberty" may be
limited by "due process of law"-as may "property," which stands alongside liberty
in this clause.'43 Properly speaking, it is thus awkward to speak of a "Liberty
Clause" as such, though Stevens is fond of doing so." Stevens impatiently ends
his opinion with "See U.S. Const. Amdt. 14."' 141 With due respect, what is needed
is a careful parsing of this, and other constitutional text, not a dismissive wave.
, Speaking of "liberty," a holistic documentarian might note that the word
appears three times in the Constitution. Two of these occasions are in the Due
Process Clauses-or Liberty Clauses, as Stevens would have it-limiting the federal
and state governments, respectively. The third is in the Preamble: "We the people
of the United States, in Order to ... secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution . ... ."" This too, is
a Liberty Clause, and it suggests that the sensitive moral balance that Nebraska
tried to strike between women and posterity was not a wholly irrational or counter-
constitutional one. 147
140. Stevens also suggests, picking up on a suggestion in Justice Ginsburg's dissent, that Nebraska's true
motivation was simply to undercut Roe. Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2617 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). This, too, is a doubtful and needlessly provocative statement-and
thin-skinned to boot, seeing only a possible insult to the Court rather than an avoidance of insult to an
innocent life.
141. 120 S. Ct. at 2617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV ("[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.").
144. See John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13,20-38
(1992).
145. 120 S. Ct. at 2617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
147. For a similar, if rather more forceful, suggestion, quoting both the Preamble's liberty/posterity
language and its "establish Justice" language, see Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2621-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia's willingness to invoke the Preamble's justice-seeking language should hearten those critics
of originalism who see this methodology as insensitive to questions of justice. See, e.g., Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 CONST. CoMM. 37 (1993).
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IV. RELIGION
Consider next the only case of the term to openly overturn a precedent,
Mitchell v. Helms."' Mitchell involved a longstanding federal program that lent
computers and other educational equipment to public and private schools,
including private religious schools.'49 By a vote of six to three, the Justices upheld
the program against an Establishment Clause challenge, although no single
opinion commanded a majority of the Court."5
Here-at last!-the Court got one right, though it remains to be seen if there are
indeed five Justices on the current Court who are truly in sync with the basic
teaching of the document.'5 ' Moreover, to get it right, the Court was obliged to
overrule two cases from the 1970s.'52 Proper realignment of doctrine and
document in the future may require still more overrulings.
Led by Justice Souter, the dissenters claimed that the Constitution is offended
whenever government aid goes directly to religious entities for religious purposes,
even if this aid does not single out religious entities for any preferential
treatment.'53 In other words, government may not, pursuant to a genuinely
secular law, give computers on a completely evenhanded basis to public schools
and private schools without regard to the private schools' religious affiliation or
lack thereof." To put it yet another way, the Constitution requires that if
government decides to give computers to private schools, it may give them to the
Secular School and the Indifferent Institute, but must withhold them from various
religious schools. If a given private school eligible for the computers later decides
to add prayer to its curriculum, while otherwise continuing to teach all the basics,
that school must forfeit its computers. The Constitution requires this
discrimination, depriving religious schools, and only religious schools, of a benefit
that all other schools receive.
But the Constitution requires no such thing-at least if the test is the best
reading of its words, history, and structure, as opposed to the many outlandish
148. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000). The Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) unsettled
the law of sentencing in ways that could well have profound repercussions in the future, but the majority
declined to openly overrule any of the Court's past cases.
149. Id. at 2537.
150. Justice Thomas authored a plurality opinion joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy. 120 S. Ct. at 2536. Justice O'Connor,joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment. Id.
at 2556. Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Id. at 2572.
151. The plurality opinion by Justice Thomas is an admirable one; but it did not command the votes of
five Justices, and there are troubling notes in Justice O'Connor's swing opinion.
152. These cases are Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977).
153. 120 S. Ct. at 2572-73 (Souter, J., dissenting). This is not a new theme for Justice Souter, and much
of my description and critique of his general approach is based on his earlier judicial statements in cases
such as Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 863-99 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting), and Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 240-54 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. See id.
(and contradictory) things that have been said about it in U.S. Reports.'55 As a
matter of text, the document renounces a national "establishment of religion."'"
Let us recall the world the Founders aimed to repudiate, a world where a powerful
church hierarchy was anointed as the official government religion, where clerics
ex officio held offices in the government, and where members of other religions
were often barred from holding government posts. With this paradigm case in
mind, we can begin to see how the First Amendment fits well with other ideas in
the document repudiating the hierarchies and inequalities of the ancient
regime-the kings, dukes, cardinals, permanent standing armies, parliamentary
pomposities, and sovereign immunities-in favor of a New World Order where no
church would be given special treatment by the federal government. All citizens
of all religions would stand equal before federal law, and equal in eligibility to
hold federal office. (Thus, in important ways, the opening words of the First
Amendment build on the closing words of Article VI, promising that "no religious
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States.")'57 On this view, there are not truly two Religion Clauses that
coexist in tension-an Establishment Clause discriminating against religion and a
Free Exercise Clause limiting the discrimination. Rather, there is one Religion
Clause, proclaiming that the federal government should neither favor nor disfavor
religion as such.
In fact, the subject of religion as such was, in general, simply beyond the
proper enumerated powers of the federal government in the states: "Congress
shall make no law"'5 s respecting-that is, on the topic of-religion qua religion. On
close inspection, this phrasing is plainly an intratextual gloss on the enumerated-
power language of Article I, proclaiming that "Congress shall have power ... to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to the Constitution's careful
division of power.'59 But to see this is to see how the Religion Clause, with its
absolutist grammar, addresses only laws that regulate religion as such-for
example, laws requiring or banning prayer, or naming some sect or sects for
special treatment. The Amendment has nothing to do with the incidental effects
on a religion of a law passed without regard to religion-for example, a law about
computers for all schools, regardless of religion. Here, Congress does indeed have
obvious enumerated power insofar as such aid to all schools helps promote the
federal economy. "6 For Congress to distinguish in its law between private schools
that sponsor prayer and those that do not-as the dissenters insist Congress
must-would be to violate this very enumerated-power idea: Whether prayer takes
place or not is simply none of Congress's business. And so the dissenters have
turned the text precisely upside down.
And the history, too. In past church-state opinions, the Mitchell dissenters
155. For detailed documentation of my admittedly sweeping assertions in this section, see Amar, Bill of
Rights, supra note 25, at 32-45, 246-57, 532-33.
156. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
157. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
158. U.S.CoNST. amend. 1.
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. (emphasis added).
160. For discussion (and explanation of the interstate externalities that render education a proper subject
for federal legislation), see generally Brest, et. al., supra note 25.
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have tried to wrap themselves in the mantle of James Madison. 6' But the kinds
of governmental aid to religion that James Madison and his allies opposed were
aids to religion as such, in laws that singled out some explicitly religious sects or
institutions or practices ("Protestants," "Christians," "churches," or "prayer," for
example). Moreover, it is a categorical mistake to automatically equate an
Amendment proposed by Congressional supermajorities and ratified by a great
many states in the 1790s with what James Madison personally believed or did in
Virginia years before. Indeed, given that the text of the First Amendment most
closely tracks the proposals of New Hampshire rather than Virginia, the Mitchell
dissenters' history is way off-as is their fundamental structural vision. In both
logic and effect, this vision discriminates against religious entities as such. On a
proper view of the matter, government need not give any aid to private schools at
all-the distinction between aid to public schools and aid to private schools is itself
a wholly secular and legitimate distinction. But if government does choose to give
aid to private schools, it should not be in the business of discriminating against
religious schools, by imposing a prayer tax. (If you pray, you must give up the
computer that everyone else gets.)
Even at the Founding, one of the big ideas of the First Amendment was
Equality-government should not favor or disfavor any religion, just as it should
not favor or disfavor a speaker because of his political viewpoint under the
neighboring Free Speech Clause. And this idea, of course, was powerfully
reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporates religious freedom
principles against the states. The Citizenship Clause condemns governmental
discrimination on the basis of birth-status, and religious discriminations are
closely akin to racial discriminations. (Indeed, some religions focus on birth
itself-one is born a Jew, for example.) White or black; male or female; rich or
poor; Jew, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Agnostic, or Atheist-we are all equal
citizens. Yet the dissenters' logic requires-not just permits, but requires-the
government to distinguish between the Atheist Academy and the Morning Prayer
Private School, whose "3Rs" curricula are otherwise identical.
There is, I admit, a considerable amount of modern doctrine, especially from
the 1970s and 80s, that lends support to the dissenters' normatively unattractive
vision. So much the worse for doctrine; so much the better for the document.
V. UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
The last case from the 1999 term that we shall consider, Troxel v.
Granville, 62 addressed the topic of unenumerated rights, an issue that might be
thought particularly difficult for a documentarian. Acting under a broadly worded
Washington state statute, a family court judge had ordered a mother to make her
161. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868-876, 890-91
(Souter, J., dissenting); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243 (Souter, J., dissenting).
162. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
two minor children available for mandatory visitation with the children's paternal
grandparents.'63 As construed, the statute allowed anyone at all to petition at any
time for compelled visitation, and authorized the judge to order such visitation
whenever the judge decided that such visitation would be in the best interest of the
child, without any need to give the slightest deference to the contrary wishes of the
parent or to make any finding of parental unworthiness."6 Invoking the doctrine
of substantive due process, the Justices voted to strike down this breathtakingly
open-ended grant of power to intrude upon parental authority in intact and
functional families.'65 As in Mitchell, however, the Justices were unable to cohere
around a majority opinion."6 Justice O'Connor wrote the lead opinion for four
Justices, and Justice Souter concurred in the judgment on the basis of similar, but
not identical reasoning. 167
Though they disagreed on details, these five Justices found common ground
in a series of Court cases, beginning in the early 1920s, affirming the strong
liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their minor children.
This open appeal to Lochner-era cases like Meyer v. Nebraska"6 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters'69 is too much for Justice Scalia, who argues that such relics of
a largely discredited judicial era "[have] small claim to stare decisis protection."17
What the trial judge did, says Scalia, may well be stupid, but the Supreme Court
does not sit to correct all stupidity.''
If the debate here looks vaguely familiar-O'Connor against Scalia on the
question of substantive due process methodology-it should. In some ways, the
debate recalls the skirmishing over this issue in Michael H. v. Gerald D." and
the battle royale in Casey v. Planned Parenthood,'73 and presages the fireworks in
Stenberg. "' It is also worth noting that the cases Scalia would thrust aside, Meyer
and Pierce, also featured prominently in Griswold v. Connecticut,' and, later,
Roe v. Wade. '76 In cases like Roe, Casey, and Stenberg, the majority might be
163. Id. at 2057-58.
164. Id. at2057.
165. Id. at 2059-65.
166. Id. at2057.
167. The plurality (Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer)
struck down the statute as applied. Id. at 2057. Justice Souter voted to invalidate it on its face. Id. at 2065.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy filed separate
dissents. Id. at 2067.
168. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
169. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
170. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2074.
172. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(setting forth narrow view of substantive due process), with id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part)
(challenging Justice Scalia's view as inconsistent with precedent).
173. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter, JJ.) (embracing expansive, precedent-based view of substantive due process), with id. at 979-84
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (challenging this view as unconstrained).
174. In Stenberg, Justice O'Connor writes a Court-centric concurrence-"Nebraska's statute cannot be
reconciled with ourdecision in [Casey] and is therefore unconstitutional." 120 S. Ct. at 2618 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia likens the majority's result to the one in Dred Scott. Id.
at 2621 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965).
176. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
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accused by critics of inventing rules nowhere in the document, while the dissenters
might be faulted by critics for ignoring a principle that is definitely in the
document, namely women's equality. A similar point applies to Troxel. The
majority insisted on talking about the non-mammalian whale'77 of substantive due
process-a phantasmagorical beast conjured up by judges without clear textual
warrant. Conversely, the dissent ignored the fact that there is indeed
constitutional text that limits state power to restrict unspecified and substantive
fundamental freedoms, namely the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1
78
But does a documentarian gain anything by changing the label on the lid of
the black box of unenumerated rights from "substantive due process" to "privileges
and immunities of citizens?" Perhaps a little. Because the very phrase
"substantive due process" teeters on self-contradiction, it does not give us a sound
starting point, or a directional push to proper legal analysis. The phrase does not
clarify thought. Granted, once the first set of substantive due process cases is on
the books, these may launch the project (so long as we don't ask where those
decisions came from). But given that the origins of the substantive due process
doctrine are not particularly admirable-Dred Scott and Lochner haunt this
swamp-perhaps we can do better.
There were indeed a core set of fundamental freedoms that the People aimed
to affirm in the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause-freedom of expression and of religion, protection against unreasonable
searches, the safeguards of habeas corpus, and so on.' These clear instances of
inclusion-with less tainted origins-give us paradigm cases from which we can
properly begin the doctrinal process of generalization, interpolation, and analogic
reasoning. Moreover, the Privileges and Immunities Clause suggests a method for
going about finding fundamental rights that is less Court-centered, and admirably
so. The Fourteenth Amendment does not exhaustively list all of Americans'
privileges and immunities, but it does rest upon a notion that such fundamental
rights are catalogued elsewhere in documents that the American People have
177. With thanks to the incomparable phrasemaking of Charles Black. See BLACK, supra note 110, at
70. Though Black, in this passage, is not describing substantive due process, he does elsewhere condemn
it as "paradoxical, even oxymoronic." CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BiRTH OF FREEDOM 3 (1997).
178. This clause does not escape Justice Thomas, however, who goes out of his way to flag the issue.
120 S. Ct. at 2067 (Thomas, J., concurring). Ofcourse, reviving the clause might require repudiating some
of the language of The Slaughter-House Cases, which (on the most straightforward and conventional
reading) virtually read the clause-the central clause of Section One!-out of the Amendment. Virtually no
serious modem scholar-left, right, and center-thinks that this is a plausible reading of the Amendment.
(The holding on the facts of the case is far more defensible than some of the overly broad language.) It is
also worth noting that the Justices who decided the case in 1873 had not exactly been cheerleaders for the
Amendment in 1867, and that the case was decided on a set a facts and at a time not especially conducive
to a generous reading of the Amendment. See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice
Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 655-78
(1994).
179. For more elaboration of this claim, and the other claims in this section, see Amar, Bill of Rights,
supra note 25, at 137-230.
broadly ratified, formally or informally. In the eyes of those who drafted and
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal Bill of Rights was one of these
catalogues-a compilation of fundamental rights that the Amendment would
henceforth guarantee ("incorporate") against states. But, the Bill of Rights was
not the only epistemic source of guidance. (In other words, the Fourteenth
Amendment aims to do more than "incorporate" the Bill of Rights.) The Magna
Carta, the English Petition of Right, the Declaration of Independence, state bills
of rights-all these, too, were proper sources of guidance for interpreters in search
of fundamental rights and freedoms. Rather than a system where Justices simply
look to what they or their predecessors have declared fundamental in self-absorbed
opinions, a more attractive and document-supported approach to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause would invite the Court to canvass nonjudicial legal sources-the
above-listed documents, state laws and constitutions, federal legislation, and so
on-as critical sources of epistemic guidance.
This law-canvassing approach is hardly a novel method. For example, the
younger Justice Harlan emphasized that the Connecticut contraception law at issue
in Griswold was utterly outlandish, as measured by the laws of all the other
states. "° Most important, law-canvassing has the salutary effect of focusing the
Justices not on themselves and their own wisdom, but on the wisdom of the
American people more generally. On this approach, the key fact in Troxel was not
so much that the Washington statute went beyond what the Court said in the
1920s, but that the statute was utterly outlandish when measured against the
historical and current practices of every other state.
180. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also, Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). For more discussion of the law-canvassing method, see Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 590-605 (1993). I do not claim that this method
is the only proper way to fill the open texture of the Fourteenth Amendment; only that it is one technique
of central significance and usefulness.
DEAN JONATHAN D. VARAT'S RESPONSE
DEAN VARAT: I agree with Akhil about many of the cases about which he
spoke, particularly with respect to Morrison' and Kimel.2 But I would like to
address his back-to-basics constitutional law, which would get away from
what he calls self-absorption by the Court in its own precedent. Akhil favors
the Court looking to the Constitution's text, its structure, its history, its
architecture, its big ideas. That seems to me to suggest a greater willingness
to allow the Court to not let intervening decisions stand in the way of
repudiation of those decisions, in order to go back to basics, if you will.
Whether that approach would actually produce the results that Akhil
would like the Court to produce is a serious question. That happens, of
course, only if they read the document the way that Akhil reads it. However,
I would pose these things in particular: if one of the concerns here is about
judicial imperialism, and we've heard a lot about that this morning, is the
right way to solve that problem to free the Court, allowing it to ignore its
earlier precedent? One view of what has happened here is that the Court is
simply hiding behind these precedents, unwilling to look more fundamentally
at the questions that underlie them. Another view, however, of the judicial
adherence to precedent or to at least some, the limitation of precedent, is that
the Court from time to time, with its changing composition of Justices, is in
fact limited to some degree by what went before it. Therefore, the Justices are
not free to strike out on their own and to change dramatically the course of the
Court.
We've already had quite a bit of discussion this morning about whether
Lopez' and Morrison mean very much and whether they will have any
significant lasting impact. Part of that, one might suppose, is a result of the
fact that there are so many cases that have been decided pointing in the other
direction that the Court tends to walk somewhat gingerly when it begins to
take a new path. Is that a bad thing? I suppose that depends on what went
before. It depends on how bad the earlier case law was. If the case was Dred
Scott v. Sandford,4 that's one thing. If the case is Wickard v. Filburn,5 one
might have a somewhat different point of view about that.
A second pragmatic question for the panel concerns competing big ideas
of the Constitution. And if one reverts to basics, different Justices might
revert in fact to very different basics. So while I actually agree with Akhil
about Morrison and Kimel, the idea of federalism and the idea of separating
the powers between states and federal government are big competing ideas of
the Constitution-ones that compete often with the notion of using congressio-
nal power to improve the equal status of a variety of groups. And while I
I. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
2. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
4. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
5. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
would be very comfortable resolving the questions in the way that Akhil
would, I nonetheless think that the current Court and other Courts might well
adopt the other point of view, even if they were pursuing a distinctly
documentary approach of the sort about which Akhil speaks.
He spoke very eloquently about the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to which I do agree the Court has not paid nearly enough
attention. I once heard another colleague of ours, Sandy Levinson, say that
the entire doctrine of the Constitution of the Supreme Court could have been
derived from the ban on titles of nobility, without need for the Fourteenth
Amendment. In some respects, that's actually an interesting exercise to think
through. That's a very big idea of the Constitution. There are times when big
ideas of liberty and big ideas of equality are in fact in some tension, although
they need not always be. The fact that one reverts to the documentarian
approach without reviewing intervening decisions by Justices who may have
wrestled very much with some of these decisions may result in a good thing,
a fresh look, or it may miss a lot of what went in between. Again that
depends on the particular people.
Though I agree with Akhil about Kimel, I do want to say one thing about
his general, very powerful notion of how much the Constitution broke with
what went before and therefore, why Kimel is at odds with that. I would say
what others have said-that there is support in English history for the notion
that the king can do no wrong, meaning not that the king can never be
thought to do any wrong and therefore is completely immune, but rather that
the king should never be understood to have done any wrong. That idea is not
so much a separation from the English tradition but actually a continuation,
in our context.
More fundamentally, I guess the only reason I raise this here, what might
seem a small quibble, is that while it's true that we have a system that began
with many breaks from England, we also have a system that followed and
received a great deal of what came before, including many notions of liberty
that I'm sure Akhil greatly favors and appreciates. So, as with the competi-
tion among big ideas, there's sometimes competition among historical ideas,
including competition among historical ideas about what came from England.
Finally, I note that in six of the seven cases Professor Amar discusses, he
believes the Court should have kept its hands off and let government act. It
is not obvious to me that judicial restraint and documentarianism are
completely aligned, and that's the last issue I would like to raise. Perhaps his
point is that doctrinal self-absorption has gotten in the way of judicial
self-restraint, even systematically. Once decisions invalidating government
action are on the books, the system of adhering to precedent, supported by the
tendency of judges to regard their own work as more important than that of
others, is too likely to lead to bad precedents, or even marginal ones, not only
to be reaffirmed but to be expanded incrementally.
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PROFESSOR KMIEC: We will have questions for Professor Amar and Dean
Varat from Marcia Coyle, the Washington Bureau Chief and U.S. Supreme
Court Correspondent of the National Law Journal.
MS. COYLE: I have a question for Professor Amar first. While we can sort of
debate the real-world impact and long-term impact of cases like Lopez and
Morrison, it would seem that the Court's work in the area of the Eleventh
Amendment and section 5 recently has had a very obvious impact, the closing
of the courthouse door to litigants who feel states violated their rights under
federal law. I'm wondering if you would look ahead as the Court is going to
be revisiting this in University of Alabama v. Garrett,6 in which the statute
at issue is the American with Disabilities Act. The case looks very much like
Kimel. Can you distinguish the two, and is there a way for the Court to
uphold what Congress did with Garrett and still be consistent with Kimel?
PROFESSOR AMAR: The case that's coming before the Court, as you have
noted, doesn't involve age discrimination, which is what Kimel involved, but
discrimination against those with disabilities, under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Not the ADEA, but the ADA. In some ways it's an easier
case to uphold congressional power, because you can say there's much more
of a record of actual discrimination against folks with disabilities-even in
courtrooms and courthouses with access, just physical access. In education.
In employment. Across a very wide range of issues, you may have a better
record of state lapses, real state discrimination, than were evident in Kimel.
On the other hand, the law itself requires not mere nondiscrimination, but
affirmative accommodation, of various sorts. That may make it harder to
sustain. I've probably suggested my sympathies are that this should be an
easy case for congressional power to be affirmed, but, you know, I have zero
votes.
MS. COYLE: This question is for Dean Varat. It's nice to hear Commerce
Clause definitions offered by Professor Kmiec and others, but right now we
have a Congress that has to deal with a five-four majority indefinitely and that
has its own view of the Commerce Clause and the Eleventh Amendment. I'm
wondering, in the real world, what can this Congress do? Professor Amar
suggested the Privilege and Immunities Clause as another way of looking at
some of these problems, but if you're a legislator, where else can you look,
and how do you think such legislation would fare before the current Court?
DEAN VARAT: Is this after January 20th?
MS. COYLE: No. This is now.
6. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
DEAN VARAT: This is now. I think it is difficult for the Congress to figure out
exactly what the scope of their powers is at the moment. I do suppose that the
report that Dean Sullivan gave a little bit ago about adding jurisdictional
elements would probably be a way of both achieving the symbolic points about
which Akhil is talking and sustaining regulation. And were I a member of
Congress, who wanted to further such legislation, I would simply do that-that
is, add the jurisdictional elements. Let me put it another way. I don't think
the Lopez and Morrison limits seem very significant. Hence, they seem
relatively easy to evade.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Akhil, I want to give you an opportunity to respond to
Dean Varat as the audience questions are being digested.
PROFESSOR AMAR: Jon raised a number of spectacularly good questions. So
you're asking just the right questions in fact. Here's one of the biggest:
who's listening? Who's ultimately the audience? I actually, Jon, agree with
you that perhaps the audience isn't the Supreme Court. I don't know whether
they are going to pay much attention to what we say. And if they actually
were more document focused, perhaps I wouldn't like at all what they think
that document really says.
So who is the addressee? I ultimately think that we should at least, as
scholars,talk amongst ourselves and talk to our students and introduce them
to the Constitution and tell them in our case books about the Supreme Court
adjudication which is not always a great progressive narrative ofjudges doing
really good things. There are very few really good things where the judges
are the leading edge of the wedge. I actually think that the best things that
the judges have often done is simply take seriously what the Constitution said
a hundred years before; I'll talk about the Warren Court in just a minute. But
if ordinary citizens knew more about the Constitution, if law students knew
more about the Constitution, if they went to the Constitution Center,7 in the
long run that might actually raise counterweights against certain tendencies
toward judicial imperialism, tendencies that I think are out there. We have
a more powerful Court than ever before in history. In part, this is because we
have a divided government at the federal level with Republicans hating
Democrats and vice versa and the Congress hating the president and vice
versa. And the Court steps in, as do the trial lawyers and the National
Association of Attorneys General, doing all sorts of things that have never
been done before. So ultimately, the addressee is us here in this room. So it's
good that we're together.
On whether I believe in judicial restraint-in judges doing little or
following the document-the examples of cases tended to be ones from this
7. Professors Amar and Kmiec serve as the inaugural scholars to the National Constitution Center, an
interpretative museum to the American Constitution, under construction in Philadelphia on Independence
Mall.
[Vol. 28: 633, 2001] Constitutional Law Symposium
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
term where the judges were doing stuff that I think they shouldn't have been
doing. They were invalidating perfectly sensible laws, including the law in
Texas, the ex post facto case of Carmell,8 and civil rights laws like in Kimel
and Morrison. In other parts of the Harvard paper though, I talk about how
the document really should have required invalidations that the Court didn't
order. The first chapter of Larry Tribe's brilliant treatise reminds us that it
was not until 1965 that the Supreme Court struck down an act of Congress on
First Amendment grounds, even though Congress had been doing dreadful
things from the Sedition Act. And the Courts say, "Sounds good by us."
So the Warren Court, just to pick a Court, overturned a lot of precedents.
I think it's one of the better Courts in history, in part because it began to take
seriously what the document really said about racial equality, about Republi-
can government, about applying the Bill of Rights to the states, about a robust
protection of free expression, about protection of religious equality. I think
the Burger Court went a little far in discriminating against religion; we'll
hear more from Michael McConnell this afternoon.
My final point is that I think the most interesting thing about the
document is what I'll call the arc of history. It's interesting that the
amendments actually come at the end, in a series of post scripts in chronologi-
cal order. It exposes the document's epic history to the ordinary eye. It's like
going to the Grand Canyon and seeing those levels of accretion. We have
been inattentive, I think, to the arc of history. We don't focus on how most
of the new Amendments are about equality and democracy and ever greater
inclusion. They're not about property and inequality.
So the folks who have pledged allegiance to the document tend to tell us
too many stories about the founding and not enough about the abolitionists,
about the women's suffrage movement, about the youth movement that gave
us the eighteen-year-old vote, and so on, the Civil Rights movements of the
'60s and the Progressive Era Amendments. So that's one of the bigger
things--let's read the document with attention to more recent Amendments,
in part because they're more inclusionary in process and substance.
PROFESSOR TRIBE: First, I love the image of the arc of history. I have a new
book coming out in which I use a constellation image, and I think the Grand
Canyon may be a lot better.
I wanted to say something about Dean Varat's notion that the commerce
power limits that have been imposed so far aren't very significant. I think we
fool ourselves if we say that. If we say, "Well, you just use a jurisdictional
8. 120 S. Ct. 1620 (2000).
hook, and you'll get the results you want." Keep in mind that, under the
Commerce Clause, no matter what they do, hook, line, or sinker, they can't,
under the current Court's view of sovereign immunity, authorize citizen suits
seeking damages against the states in federal court even though the states are
the violators. They have to go to the Fourteenth Amendment, and when they
do, they bump up against City of Boerne v. Flores9 and a very narrow view in
Kimel and College Savings v. Florida Prepaid"° of what Congress can do
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. And we have a Court that is
not terribly likely to accept the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
or especially the Citizenship Clause, without the accretions of historic
precedents to back it up, is a source of authority, although I completely agree
with Akhil's reading.
We are dead up against the same five-to-four majority over and over
again. Our Court says there isn't anything citizen victims can do to win
compensation in federal court against certain kinds of state wrongs. I think
that's a profound limitation, and only a replacement of one of the current five
majority Justices will change it. It's as simple as that.
DEAN SULLIVAN: Except you can throw money at it. Until South Dakota v.
Dole" is overruled, Congress can use the leverage of spending to compel the
states to do a lot of things. And it's surprising that the Rehnquist Court,
which vowed to bring back National League of Cities,2 hasn't.
PROFESSOR TRIBE: But there's a huge literature that South Dakota v. Dole is
so obviously inconsistent with what the Court is doing in other areas that I
wouldn't count on the spending power persisting as a source. And anything
that depends on the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to
vindicate rights against the government isn't, I think, an adequate line of
defense. True, in addition to the spending power, theoretically you could have
federal agencies bring suits instead of citizens. But again, relying on federal
agencies, despite the occasional Kessler 3 and FDA, 4 is inadequate. So I
don't think one should say the sky is falling, but I don't think one should say
it's a bright sunny day in terms of what the Supreme Court is doing in these
areas.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Just one thought which I believe is explanatory, and this
is a Kmiec axiom: one constitutional mutation always breeds another, though
not always immediately or directly. To the Court, the over-extension of the
commerce power is part of the bitter fruit of a failed Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence. And the Eleventh Amendment cases, as nontextual or
9. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
10. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
It. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
12. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
13. Kessler v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 121 S. Ct. 779 (2001).
14. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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historically troubled as they may be, is basically saying that "well, if you're
not going to control yourselves, Congress, we're not going to let citizens sue
the states based on your illicit handiwork." If citizens want to sue their states,
they will need to get the states to enact a law that protects them against age
discrimination or disability discrimination, and then sue in state court. By
this means, the federalism that was strangled by an overextended conception
of federal power or a withered view of the Tenth Amendment is restored:
mutation breeds mutation. Part of the message, I think, of the Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence is that it is a result of mistakes made elsewhere in
the arc of history or in the constellation.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I have some thoughts. One thing that I'm a bit
uncomfortable with in the conversation is that we're trying to assess the
overall impact of decisions that are all five years old or less. Lopez was 1995.
City of Boerne was 1997. Printz"5 was 1997. Florida Prepaid and Alden v.
Maine6 were 1999. Morrison is the year 2000. And to look at all these cases
and say, "Wow, they don't make that much of a difference yet," is taking a
very short-term perspective. I think if these cases are looked at cumulatively
and if they're extended along a projection into the future, they're a radical
change in American government. And I don't know if that projection is
going to happen because we are sitting here in the year 2000. But I'd be very
cautious about minimizing impact of decisions that are so recent.
DEAN VARAT: May I be clear that when I was responding to the question, I was
not responding on the overall notion of all of those cases taken together,
which I do think is a somewhat different story.
PROFESSOR AMAR: As Larry said, the really interesting thing is the pincers
created by the combination of the Eleventh Amendment and the Fourteenth,
because you can't do certain things in the Eleventh unless you invoke the
Fourteenth. I love Justice Kennedy, but Boerne is my candidate for the most
imperialistic decision of the decade. And in part, I'm so emphatic about this
because it really destroys one of the very big outcomes of the Civil War, that
Congress should have broad power, and we don't really hear any judicial
dissents at all about this. And that's maybe then the job of the academic to
tell the students: here's what isn't being said on the Court that should be
said.
15. Printz v. United States, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
16. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).

